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CROSS CULTURAL REFLECTIONS:
TEACHING THE CHARTER TO
AMERICANS©
By JAMIE CAMERON*
In this article, the author discusses a course in Comparative
Constitutional Jurisprudence that she taught at Cornell Law School in
the winter semester of 1989. She is particularly interested in the way this
class of American students responded to the Supreme Court of Canada's
interpretation of the Charter. She presents her reflections on differences
between Canadian and American constitutional culture through a
discussion of the decisions in The Motor Vehicle Reference, R v.
Morgentaler, and The French Language Case.
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I. ODE TO THE ROAD
My life as an academic began at Cornell Law School in 1982-
83, and it seemed appropriate, during my first sabbatical, to return
to those roots. In my eagerness to resume old friendships and make
some new, I overlooked one detail: assuming fair weather, sparse
traffic at the border, and moderately aggressive driving, it takes a
little more than four hours to get from Toronto to the parking lot
at Cornell. After thirteen weeks of numbing driving, across a dark,
lonely, and often dangerous stretch of snow belt highway, the result
is an account of my seminar on Comparative Constitutional
Jurisprudence.
After the last class, I literally drove off into the sunset. By
then I was aware that almost none of my reflective thinking about
the course occurred at Cornell, "far above Cayuga's waters," in an
office overlooking a spectacular gorge.1 Instead, it took place along
the New York Thruway, as I pondered what Americans said about
the Charter.2  On my final journey, a remarkable sunset, in
combination with a sense of conclusion and relief, produced an
interlude in which a series of disparate reflections about the nature
of constitutional culture fell into place.
On the first day of class, I told the students that it was not
my job to proselytize about Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms;
that instead, this would be a course about culture and ideology.
Using the Charter as my vehicle, so to speak, I would try to disarm
a sense of cultural complacency that the outside world often
perceives as being typically American. 3  An iconoclastic approach
which challenged their basic assumptions about democratic values
and individual rights, I hoped, would force these students to assess
the ideological values they too readily take for granted.
"Far Above Cayuga's Waters" is Cornell's Alma Mater and is sung to the hymnal tune
"Glory to His Name."
2 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Acq 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
3 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. by J.P. Mayer (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday/Anchor Books, 1969) at 237.
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In addition, I told them I was keenly interested in their
impressions of the Charter. Although American students are more
curious about Canada than we think, they still know little about us.
Most of the time, this group contributed responses which were
thoughtful, open-minded, and flexible. Even so, I had little idea in
advance just how baffled they would be by certain aspects of the
Charter. Sometimes they reacted to Canadian decisions in ways that
were predictable, but other times they caught me completely off
guard. Even when I could anticipate the conclusion they reached,
they would support it with arguments that were distinctly un-
Canadian. Curiosity forced me to try and explain these results.
What follows are my reflections on teaching the Charter to
Americans. They are based on comments Cornell students made in
class, in conversation with me outside of class, and in their papers.
Whether any other group of American students would respond in a
similar way, I cannot guess. And then there is my own subjectivity.
Often I thought the hardest about points that may seem obvious or
unimportant. Here I have caricatured and enhanced simple insights
to bring the cultural perspective into sharper focus. These factors
make this an interpretation that is somewhat anecdotal.4 Such
limitations of necessity make these impressions preliminary. Even
so, this group of students advanced my understanding of
constitutional culture in ways I never expected.
This paper provides a cultural re-interpretation of three
Supreme Court of Canada decisions. It singles out The Motor
Vehicle Reference,5 R. v. Morgentaler,6 and The French Language
Case7 because American students responded to these decisions in
ways that interested me. Although some observations may seem
obvious, and this an exercise in truism, our understanding of the
Charter can only benefit from an awareness of basic cultural
4 1 have not provided the usual footnote documentation of statements I make in the text.
Although it is readily available, I decided that including it would compromise the spontaneity
of this piece.
5 Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486
[hereinafter The Motor Vehicle Reference].
6 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 [hereinafter Morgentaler].
7 Ford v. A.G. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 [hereinafter The French Language Case].
1990] 615
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assumptions about the nature of a constitution, and of judicial
review. These assumptions are pervasive, and a more powerful
influence in our respective constitutional traditions than we realize.
As a result of this course, I am more acutely aware of the degree to
which these perceptions influence the way Canadians and Americans
think about their Constitutions.
II. AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHARTER DECISIONS
A. Introduction
The course followed a simple outline. After commencing
with an introduction to Canada's pre-Charter tradition, we compared
the texts of the u.s. Bill of Rights and of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. From there, given time and subject matter
constraints, we focussed on sections 7, 2, and 15 of the Charter, and
their American equivalents. In discussing specific guarantees, we
analyzed the relationship between the substantive provision and
section 1 before debating particular issues like hate literature,
abortion, Sunday closing, and affirmative action. The schedule was
adjusted to accommodate a guest speaker, newly released decisions,
and the American students' interest in religion and the state. Our
final sessions tried to put our discussions into a broader cultural
perspective.
B. The Motor Vehicle Reference8
I expected a routine discussion of The Motor Vehicle
Reference. Previously, we had referred in passing to the u.s.
Supreme Court's then upcoming reconsideration of Roe v. Wade.9
On that issue, the class had emphatically disapproved of any retreat
from Roe's assertion of a woman's right to seek an abortion.
10
8 Supra, note 5.
9 410 U.S. 113 (1973) [hereinafter Roe].
10 See infra, note 40.
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Whatever they thought of section 94(2) of the B.C. Motor Vehicle
Act, I assumed they would support a substantive interpretation of
section 7. In anticipation of that response, my opening remarks in
class challenged the Supreme Court of Canada's interpretation of
section 7. Much to my surprise, these students wholeheartedly
embraced the critique.
I was taken aback by their consensus that The Motor Vehicle
Reference was an unwise decision. The students had little difficulty
with the ultimate result: in their view, legislation that joined a
requirement of absolute liability with the prospect of imprisonment
was grossly unjust.1 Notwithstanding that view, they characterized
the Supreme Court of Canada's interpretation of section 7 as
unprincipled. As far as they were concerned, the intent of the
framers was authoritative and binding. By dismissing that intent out
of hand, and rather casually, from their perspective, the Canadian
Court had acted improperly.
This response startled me. First, in the context of abortion,
the students had already endorsed substantive due process and a
liberal12 interpretation of the u.s. Constitution. Without necessarily
precluding original intent as a theory of interpretation, their
endorsement of abortion rights made it unlikely that they would
consider the intent of the framers a compelling basis for review. In
the United States, original intent is a conservative theory of review
synonymous with judicial restraint.13  There, it is awkward, if not
impossible, to follow original intent and simultaneously support a
11 Subsection (1) of section 94 of the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 288 provided
that anyone who drives despite legal prohibitions or during suspension of his driver's licence
commits an offence and is subject to imprisonment. Subsection (2) stated that those who
contravene subsection (1) are absolutely liable.
12 In this paper, I use the words liberal, progressive, and conservative in the way they are
popularly understood in contemporary American constitutional discourse. The Warren Court
of the 1950s and 1960s may be the best example of a liberal or progressive approach; and
today, Justices Brennan and Marshall are the two stalwarts of that tradition. Robert Bork,
President Reagan's unsuccessful Supreme Court nominee, is one of the better known
contemporary exemplars of a conservative judicial style.
13 See, for example, E. Meese III, 'The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark
of a Limited Constitution" (1986) 27 S. Tex. L. Rev. 455.
1990]
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woman's right to seek an abortion.14  Second, it is rare, and almost
unheard of, for Canadians themselves to criticize the Supreme Court
of Canada's departure from original intent in this decision. Although
a handful of students at Osgoode Hall Law School will typically
insist that the intent of the framers is authoritative, the majority
invariably concludes that original intent is relevant but not
dispositive. In other words, original intent can be invoked to
support a just result, but it should not be used to perpetuate an
injustice, like segregation15 or section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle
Act. As an academic, I am unaware of any support for a restricted,
procedural interpretation of section 7 on grounds of original intent.
16
The argument more often takes the form of a nostalgia about our
tradition of parliamentary supremacy, an idealism about democratic
process, a Marxist interpretation of power and struggle, or a hostility
towards the Americanization of review in Canada.
Cornell students gave a simple and straightforward
explanation of their position. In their view, original intent was
authoritative in Canada, but not in the United States, because the
Charter was enacted only a few years ago. Accordingly, the
irresolvable problems of ascertainability and reliability that necessarily
defeat the attempt to rely on the intent of the framers in the United
States do not exist in Canada. Their instinct that timing and context
place original intent in a different light was undoubtedly sound.
14 Abortion rights can only be reconciled with the intent of the framers if that intent is
described in abstract, general terms, such as individual autonomy. At that stage, however, it
is a meaningless interpretive tool. Once the specific intent of the framers is examined, it
becomes virtually impossible to reconcile this theory of interpretation with the constitutional
right to an abortion.
15 Segregation was not considered inconsistent with the equal protection clause as
originally proposed. A.M. Bickel, 'The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision"
(1955) 69 Harv. L Rev. 1. The U.S. Supreme Court did not reject the argument from intent
until Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16 In "Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1985-86 Term" (1987) 9 Sup. Ct L.
Rev. 69 at 80-82, Patrick Monahan and Andrew Petter provide a critique of The Motor Vehicle
Reference, which discusses the legislative history and intended scope of section 7 but makes
no claim that the intent was binding. Similarly, in 'The Motor Vehicle Reference and the
Relevance of American Doctrine in Charter Adjudication" in R. Sharpe, ed., Constitutional
Litigation (Toronto: Butterworths, 1986) 69 at 95, I suggest that the Supreme Court of
Canada should have given the underlying reasons for those concerns careful consideration; but
I do not conclude that the intent was authoritative just because it was the intent.
[VOL. 28 NO. 3
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What puzzled me was a Canadian tendency to explain away an
instinct this group of American students found compelling. In
expecting Cornell students to rationalize The Motor Vehicle
Reference's departure from original intent the way Canadians have,
I revealed my own limits: I had underestimated their powers of
cultural discernment. By suggesting that a doctrine should apply in
Canada, despite being rejected in the United States, they were
telling me that the Charter's distinctive setting could support a
different result.
At that point, it seemed appropriate for me to challenge
original intent as a theory of interpretation. My first argument was
that the students could not assume the Canadian framers' intent was
clear and ascertainable just because it was recent. After exploring
that difficulty, I ventured beyond the technical problem of divining
what the intent of the framers was and argued that original intent
should never be considered, much less determine the outcome.
17
Although progressive American commentary supports this view, the
reality is that, today, the technical problem of reliably ascertaining
the intent of the u.s. framers of 1787 is insuperable. For that
reason, the pure interpretive question about the moral and
jurisprudential authority of original intent no longer exists in the
United States. It is inescapably intertwined with the evidentiary
problem. Despite my effort to raise the jurisprudential question, the
American students would not budge from the view that, for purposes
of the Charter, the specific intent of framers, voiced as recently as
1982, was authoritative.
18
I puzzled this out on the Thruway. It was not clear why
liberal American students would consider a conservative theory of
interpretation binding, while most Canadians regard it as only slightly
17 The technical arguments are that original intent is so indeterminate that it is infinitely
manipulable, and that there is no such thing as intent in constitution-making anyway, because
it is not a discrete event participated in by discrete individuals but, more often, a complex
process. The jurisprudential argument is that the past has no necessary moral claim on the
present and accordingly, that the intent of yesterday's framers should not dictate the needs
of today's society.
18 They concluded that, in The Motor Vehicle Reference, Justice Lamer had effectively
conceded the existence of a specific intent but had declined to follow it because it would mean
that the comments of a few civil servants had frozen the content of one of the Charter's
substantial guarantees. See text accompanying note 39, infra at 624ff.
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relevant, and almost never dispositive. Eventually, I concluded that
this divergence of views could be explained by distinctive cultural
perceptions about judicial review and constitution-making in Canada
and the United States.
19
Paradoxically, Americans would defend the institution of
review to the death while debating its legitimacy all the way.
Despite glorifying the Constitution, and the jurisprudence it has
generated, controversy about judicial review is ever present in the
United States. Discussion is sharply focussed and the commentators
bitterly divided. Because it is largely foreign to us, Canadians are
confused by this display of schizophrenia. After all, the purpose of
review is the same in Canada and the United States: to enforce the
Constitution against sources of authority which violate its terms.
But still, it is understood differently in the two countries.
Traditionally, we neither aggrandized the Supreme Court of Canada
nor questioned its authority: lacking the power of "rights review," it
truly was the "least dangerous" branch.2 ° That realization gave me
an important clue to the Cornell students' endorsement of original
intent.
In the United States, the purpose of judicial review,
institutionally, is to enforce the principle of limited government. Not
only does it prevent a tyrannical majority from oppressing powerless
minorities, the judiciary also protects the people, collectively, from
corruption and abuse of authority at the hands of the other branches
of government. In the absence of formal limits on the judiciary's
authority, however, Americans learned that their unchecked power
can be as tyrannical as any source of political authority. Although
review is legitimate if it prevents tyranny by the other branches, it
can only avoid being tyrannical itself if its scope is limited.
Unfortunately, the text of the u.s. Constitution neither confers nor
19 Throughout this paper, I make observations that might be characterized as truisms.
It is in the nature of a truism that it generalizes. I have tried to indicate where my
generalizations would be qualified in a lengthier discussion.
20 Americans tirelessly debate Alexander Hamilton's 78th Federalist description of the
judiciary as the least dangerous branch. By contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada was
referred to in 1966 as a "quiet court in an unquiet country." R.I. Cheffins, 'The Supreme
Court of Canada: A Quiet Court In An Unquiet Country" (1966) 4 Osgoode Hall Li. 259.
620 [VOL. 28 No. 3
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limits that authority.21 The prelude to the court crisis of 1937
revealed that self-restraint is the only real check on the power of
the judiciary.
22
In recent years, it has been the function of constitutional
theory to legitimize review, and this can only be done by suggesting
what its limits should be. Thus, every theory of review claims to
have discovered the magic boundary between the legitimate exercise
of judicial authority and encroachments on the other branches.
23
Although original intent is one of many theories, it proposes,
uniquely, to limit the judiciary's authority by tying it to the intent of
the framers. Because Canadians traditionally have not been
concerned about restraining the judiciary, and, indeed, under the
Canadian Bill of Rights, encouraged the courts to be more active, we
lack America's innate suspicion of judicial power. Accordingly, The
Motor Vehicle Reference may have been less problematic at this stage
in the Charter's evolution because achieving a just result in a
particular case is perceived as a higher priority than prescribing limits
on an anti-democratic source of institutional power.
24
21 Although Article III, 52 extends the judicial power to all "[c]ases ... arising under this
Constitution," it does not explicitly confer the authority to review the actions of the other
branches. Article VI is often cited to provide textual justification for judicial review; it
appears, however, to address an issue of federal-state relations and states only that "[t]his
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ...
shall be the Supreme Law of the Land...." See, generally, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803) [hereinafter Marbury].
22 The observation was first made by Justice Stone, dissenting in United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1 at 79 (1936), which invalidated the Agricultural Adjustment Act, one of Roosevelt's
more important New Deal initiatives. Despite precipitating a crisis which resulted in the
reversal of precedent, Roosevelt's Court-packing plan demonstrated that the Court is
effectively immune from direct executive or legislative interference. Without belittling their
importance, the powers to appoint the U.S. Supreme Court and to override its decisions
through constitutional amendment constitute checks on its authority that are more formal than
real.
23 P. Brest, "he Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship" (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 1063 provides a good summary of
the mainstream theories.
24 1 am not suggesting that there is a lack of concern about the power the Charter gives
the judiciary. Concerns were voiced during the negotiation of the patriation package, and will
be found in much of the commentary on Supreme Court of Canada decisions, as well as in
the popular press. What I am suggesting, instead, is that the search for limits based on a
theory of interpretation is much more advanced in the United States at this time, for reasons
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The above analysis still does not explain why the Cornell
students favoured this particular theory of interpretation in this
contextual setting. I found the answer in distinctive perceptions of
the Constitution itself. In the United States, the most frequently
invoked argument against substantive due process is interpretivism.
Commentators argue that the authority for review must be found in
the text and, therefore, that it is not legitimate for the judiciary to
invalidate duly enacted legislation through reliance on extra-textual
values.25 This argument is appealing for two reasons. First, in the
search for limits on judicial power, textualism provides a solution
that seems obvious, concrete, and objective. 26 Second, experience
has proved the point. The unhappy era of laissez-faire
constitutionalism in the early twentieth century provides a compelling
example of the reasons why Americans denounce decisions that
invoke extra-textual values to invalidate democratically enacted
legislation.
27
In the context of The Motor Vehicle Reference, American
students saw a clear, undeniable, and very recent indication that
section 7 should not protect substantive values. If the text was
ambiguous, the specific intent of the framers made the interpretive
issue irrefutable.28 The availability of evidence from those who
directly participated in constitutional reform made it convenient for
Cornell students to claim that their intent should prevail. Their
insistence that this intent should be considered authoritative can be
that are both historical and ideological.
25 As Justice White recently explained, "Fundamental liberties and interests are most
clearly present when the Constitution provides specific textual recognition of their existence
and importance." By contrast, when the Court defines as "fundamental" liberties that arc
"nowhere mentioned in the Constitution," it opens itself to the accusation that "in the name of
identifying constitutional principles ... the Court has done nothing more than impose its own
controversial choices of value upon the people...." Thomburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169 at 2194 (1986) (dissenting opinion; emphasis
added).
26 Review pursuant to the words of the text is undoubtedly legitimate; the real question
is whether the text should be the exclusive source of authority for review.
27 For a brief summary, see Cameron, supra, note 16 at 82-87.
28 Section 7 states: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and
the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice."
622 [VOL. 28 No. 3
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traced, I believe, to basic assumptions about the nature of
constitution-making.29 This insight only occurred to me as I followed
the contemporaneous debate on the Meech Lake Accord. °
Recognizing that American and Canadian students have
different perceptions of the process of constitution-making and
constitutional reform was the key. In the United States, the
American revolutionaries and framers are venerated as great and
patriotic men' Ironically, Americans lionize these individuals but
simultaneously believe that the Constitution belongs to the people,
and that the people actively participated in its formation.32 The
revolutionary experience, the preamble to the Constitution, its
underlying ideology, and the constitutional convention and
ratification mechanisms all support this perception.33 Whatever
actually happened, Americans believe that the people collectively
won their independence and collectively established the Constitution.
29 One other factor should be acknowledged. Generally speaking, American courts rely
more heavily on evidence of original intent and legislative history than their Canadian
counterparts. Although Canadian courts have adopted a more flexible approach in recent
years, the fact remains that reliance on constitutional and legislative intent is a more familiar
and authoritative interpretive technique in the United States. Whereas Canadian students
might not consider it especially noteworthy, a judicial interpretation that discounted such vital
evidence could easily strike American students as unusual.
30 Although the Accord was initially attacked by feminists concerned about the "distinct
society" clause and a handful of others troubled by the consequences for federalism, those
indications of discontent subsequently resulted in two provinces refusing to ratify the
agreement, a third threatening to revoke its ratification, and widespread popular disapproval.
31 Although participants in the Declaration of Independence and Constitutional
Convention of 1787 are seen this way, the amendments arising from the Civil War recall an
unhappy period in national life. To idealize the equal protection clause, Americans overlook
the circumstances surrounding the imposition of the Civil War amendments and glorify
Abraham Lincoln and the words of the equal protection clause, or otherwise trace its pedigree
back to the Declaration of Independence, which asserts that "all men are born equal"
(emphasis added).
32 Indeed, one Cornell student, in a paper entitled "Section 33 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms," argued for a repeal of section 33 of the Charter, saying that "[t]he
purpose of the Charter ... is to entrench the liberties that belong to the people of Canada"
(emphasis added).
33 Although it analyzes the role a distrust of authority plays in American constitutional
culture, J. Cameron, "Liberty, Authority and the State in American Constitutionalism" (1987)
25 Osgoode Hall LJ. 258 summarizes these events and acknowledges the romantic
interpretation they have traditionally been given.
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In the United States, the Constitution speaks for the people
because, metaphorically, it is the people.
Canadians, by contrast, do not think this way. Some might
consider former Prime Minister Trudeau a visionary, and the
patriation of the Constitution a singular achievement. In the
circumstances, however, it is difficult to idealize that event. The
story of constitutional reform in recent years has been marked by
bullying, bitterness, and internecine rivalry. Prime Minister Trudeau
threatened to use his formal legal authority in apparent indifference
to the objections of his provincial counterparts and the moral
conventions of Canadian federalism. Even after The Patriation
Reference,34 it was initially unclear whether the Prime Minister would
renegotiate with the eight dissident provinces. In the end, the
province of Quebec declined to participate in an event we were told
to celebrate as the culminating event of our nationhood. The public
was involved only peripherally, through lobbying on the part of
special interest groups and the contributions of a few significant
public figures3 5 Among the literature analyzing this pivotal event
is a book titled And No One Cheered.36
Although American constitution-making may not have been
more glorious, Canadians have lived through a process of
constitution-making which is much less remote in time. Today,
lingering resentment about the process of constitutional reform is
manifested in a backlash about the terms of the Meech Lake Accord
and the way it was negotiated. In such circumstances, Justice
Lamer's dismissal of the section 7 evidence as "the comments of a
few federal civil servants" seems less inapt.37  Canadian students
34A.G. Manitoba v. A.G. Canada, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 (concluding that the federal
government's unilateral patriation package was legally valid but unconstitutional in the
conventional sense) [hereinafter The Patriation Reference].
35 B.A. Ackerman & R.E. Charney discuss the proposed referendum and the role of the
people in Canada's process of constitutional reform in "Canada at the Constitutional
Crossroads" (1981) 34 U.T.L.J. 117.
36 K Banting & R. Simeon, eds (Toronto: Methuen, 1983); see also R. Sheppard & M.
Valpy, The National Deal (Toronto: Fleet Books, 1982).
37 The Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 5 at 508. Dean John Whyte of Queen's
University Law School, a participant in the patriation negotiations, might dispute this
characterization, but I do not know of anyone else who either has or would dispute it.
624 [VOL. 28 No. 3
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regularly invoke those words to rebut the argument that the intent
of the framers should carry moral weight.
More poignantly aware of the need for limits on judicial
review, and inclined to romanticize the processes that brought their
Constitution into existence, American students disapproved of The
Motor Vehicle Reference by projecting their cultural perceptions onto
Canada's Charter.38 By contrast, the political experiences of recent
years have given us little reason to exalt the process of constitutional
reform or the role of the framers. Until Canadians appreciate the
awesome powers of the judiciary, we will be less inclined to distrust
the institution of review. From a cultural perspective, these
dynamics suggest that the Supreme Court of Canada's rejection of
original intent was as sound as the American instinct that it should
be binding.
C. R. v. Morgentaler39
Throughout the spring of 1989, the status of Roe v. Wade
was in jeopardy.40 In the circumstances, it did not surprise me that
38 I do not suggest that all American law students, or even a majority, would consider
the intent of the framers binding in these circumstances. I claim only that to the extent that
this group of students did, cultural assumptions partially explain their response.
3 9 Supra, note 6 (invalidating section 251 of the Criminal Code, which prohibited abortion
except in prescribed circumstances).
40 The U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services
in April 1989 and rendered its judgment on 3 July 1989 (109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989)). This case
challenged three elements of Missouri legislation dealing with abortion: (1) a statutory
preamble pronouncing that human life begins at conception; (2) a requirement that physicians
make specific findings about fetal viability; and (3) a ban on the use of the services of public
employees or the facilities of public institutions to encourage or conduct abortion procedures.
In deciding the constitutionality of these provisions, the U.S. Supreme Court had the option
of overturning Roe v. Wade, retreating from it by upholding these statutory measures, or of
invalidating the provisions on a strict application of precedent. In a sharply divided judgment,
a plurality upheld the Missouri legislation. The Court unanimously held that the preamble
was not justiciable on the facts before it, and the challenge to the ban on the use of public
funds for "encouraging or counselling" abortions was abandoned. However, five judges upheld
the viability-testing provision and the ban on the use of public funds for "performing or
assisting" abortions. One of the concurring judges would have overruled Roe, and one other
explicitly held that reconsideration of Roe was not necessary. Two judges, joined by two
others, registered strong dissents.
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students who supported Roe found the decision in Morgentaler
wanting. It bears emphasizing that, ideologically, theirs is a tradition
of constitutional liberalism. From an American student's perspective,
the u.s. Supreme Court had issued a bold, unequivocal decision
protecting the right to an abortion fifteen years ago, and that
doctrinal icon was in jeopardy.41 Alongside Roe, the Canadian
decision struck them as vacillating and tentative. The American
students were uncomfortable with the opinions by Chief Justice
Dickson and Justice Beetz, which invalidated the legislation on
procedural grounds. In their view, a procedural approach was
dishonest, and a transparent attempt to disguise a substantive
conclusion.42 They preferred to engage the issue through the
concurring opinion of Justice Wilson, and through the dissent by
Justice McIntyre.43 Moreover, without suggesting that it should
41 Roe v. Wade, supra, note 9, not only protected the right to an abortion, but also
articulated a set of principles, based on the three trimesters of a pregnancy, to determine the
constitutionality of regulations affecting or burdening the constitutional right to an abortion.
By any standard, Roe was a remarkable decision; particularly noteworthy are its trimester
framework, which had the appearance of a statutory scheme, and its protection of a right not
explicitly guaranteed by the constitutional text. Although the controversy that followed in its
wake polarized the nation, the Roe decision is idealized by those who support its result.
42 Chief Justice Dickson, Justice Lamer concurring, held that Canada's abortion law
constituted state interference with bodily and psychological integrity, amounting to a violation
of the section 7 guarantee of security of the person. The regulatory framework was
unconstitutional because its exculpatory provisions had been implemented in a way that
created unfair procedural irregularities. Justice Beetz, Justice Estey concurring, held that the
procedural requirements delayed the legal procurement of an abortion, thus creating an
unjustifiable risk to maternal health. Although he considered the requirement of a medical
opinion justifiable, he concluded that some of the additional procedural delays were
unnecessary, and not rationally related to the legislative purpose of protecting the fetus. Both
opinions claimed the case did not raise a substantive issue about the status of abortion under
section 7.
43 The style of Justice Wilson's opinion is American: not only is it individualist in tone,
it explicitly discusses Roe v. Wade and concludes that section 7 guarantees a woman's
substantive right to seek an abortion. Justice McIntyre's dissenting opinion, joined in by
Justice La Forest, is a classic example of judicial restraint. That opinion likewise has
numerous counterparts in the American jurisprudence.
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have been persuasive, they found it odd that only one of the Court's
four opinions cited Roe v. Wade.44
The Supreme Court of Canada attempted to defuse the
controversy inherent in its decision by invalidating the statutory
framework and simultaneously indicating that more careful legislation
might not be unconstitutional. From one perspective, this solution
can be considered a masterful stroke of judicial statesmanship.
45
However, under a different conception of its institutional role, the
Court can be criticized for refusing to face the substantive issue
square on. Any compromise between women's rights and
Parliament's prerogative to restrict abortion could only be effected
by distorting the concepts of substance and procedure. Under this
view, however, such a compromise is inappropriate because the court
has a responsibility to choose definitively between the litigants'
claims. This class of Cornell students clearly favoured the latter
approach. Even though principles of institutional prudence exist in
both countries, their response suggested that different perceptions
of institutional relations prevail in Canada and the United States.
Cornell students found it puzzling that the Supreme Court
of Canada would invalidate an entire regulatory scheme and then
encourage Parliament to re-draft the legislation. Their impression
was one of a Court unwilling to assert its authority.46 The point
was not that a court could not invalidate an existing statutory
scheme without anticipating a fresh legislative initiative.
Paradoxically, this extraordinary decision removing all criminal
44 Surprisingly, Cornell students rarely, if ever, suggested that the Canadian courts should
adopt specific American doctrines. At the same time, however, they concluded that the
Canadian courts could benefit from the U.S. jurisprudence by addressing its relative strengths
and weaknesses. In the context of abortion, Roe v. Wade is such a powerful decision that the
students found the Supreme Court of Canada's disregard difficult to understand.
45 Like the U.S. Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison, supra, note 21, and like its own
approach in The Patriation Reference, supra, note 34, in Morgentaler, the Supreme Court of
Canada asserted its authority to engage in review, but without denying Parliament its legislative
prerogative. But see infra, note 47.
46 Some students had a similar reaction to The French Language Case, supra, note 7.
There, the Court's acquiescence in Quebee's omnibus override legislation struck them as odd.
They found it difficult to understand why the Court did not actively discourage reliance on
the override, even if it could not prevent it, thereby preserving its institutional prerogative.
Section 33 of the Charter allows legislatures and Parliament to override provisions in the
Charter.
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sanctions, but on procedural grounds, was ultimately apologetic.
American students interpreted the Court's insistence that it had not
addressed the substantive issue as an unnecessary apology, as an
attempt to convince Parliament, itself, and the public that the case
truly turned on procedure rather than substance, and as a less than
sincere effort to preserve an appearance the decision belied. Unlike
the decision in Roe v. Wade, Morgentaler refused to discuss the status
of abortion or indicate what the Constitution required.47
The American students speculated that because our Court
was unwilling to portray itself as Parliament's adversary, it self-
consciously sought to present itself as a co-operative but flexible
protector of individual rights. They also found the decision's
aftermath quite unprecedented. For them, a dialogue in which
Parliament and the Court each proclaimed the other's responsibility
to determine the status of abortion was foreign.48 Beyond the trite
observation that institutions, whether Canadian or American, will
47 From an American perspective, the Court's refusal to articulate, or even discuss, what
limits the Charter would impose on the state's regulatory authority could almost be described
as an abdication of its institutional responsibility. Once again, their point of reference was
Roe v. Wade, and its explicit trimester framework.
Nor, on closer examination, does Morgentaler bear much resemblance to Marbuy.
There, by asserting its power to supervise both the executive and legislative branches of
government, the U.S. Supreme Court maximized its institutional authority, despite denying the
relief requested. The same is not true of the decision in Morgentaler.
48 A hearing in Joe Borowski's case, testing the constitutional status of the fetus, was
pending at the time Morgentaler was decided. (Leave granted 3 September 1987.) In the
circumstances, it unquestionably would have been unwise for the Supreme Court of Canada
to prejudge that issue in any way. Following Morgentaler, however, it initially appeared that
Parliament would propose new legislation. When it became impossible to achieve any
consensus, the initiative foundered. The institutional see-saw began when the Attorney
General of Canada sought a postponement of the Borowski hearing, but not a dismissal of the
appeal. When the Court denied this request on 19 July 1988, Parliament announced it would
not legislate until the Supreme Court of Canada determined whether the fetus had
constitutional rights. When the Court finally heard the case, it concluded that it could not
determine that question in the absence of any basis for a constitutional challenge. See
Borowsld v. A.G. Canada, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342. After the course concluded, this legislative
hiatus resulted in two biological fathers seeking civil injunctions to prevent their respective co-
procreators from obtaining an abortion. In an Ontario case, Murphy v. Dodd (1989), 70 O.R.
(21D) 681 (H.C.), Barbara Dodd's ex-boyfriend was refused an injunction to prevent her
abortion. However, Chantal Daigle was forbidden by the Quebec courts from having an
abortion until the Supreme Court of Canada reversed the lower courts and granted her appeal.
See Tremblay v. Daigle [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530. If it had not been apparent before, those two
episodes made patently clear the institutional inefficiency of leaving the resolution of this issue
to the ad hoc and adversarial processes of litigation.
[VOL. 28 No. 3
1990] Teaching the Charter to Americans 629
seek to avoid unwelcome attention, this incident suggested the
significance of cultural attitudes about institutional relations.
In the United States, the separation of powers, together with
its system of checks and balances, created adversaries of the three
branches of federal government.49 Very recently, important cases
have litigated conflict between the executive and legislative
branches5 ° President Reagan became embroiled in the Iran-Contra
scandal by defying Congress's prohibition on arms funding. The u.s.
Senate rejected presidential Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork
in 1988, and shortly thereafter, refused to ratify President Bush's
proposed Secretary of Defense, John Tower 5
Precisely because they are co-equals, the co-ordinate branches
are adversaries. The u.s. Supreme Court has always been aware of
these dynamics, including the constant prospect of unpleasant
relations with the other branches. Because it cannot compel those
branches to obey, and lacks any independent power to enforce its
decisions, flagrant disregard is a risk the u.s. Supreme Court must
consider in rendering its decisions.52  From time to time, the
49 Obviously, they are not relentless, undeterred foes, and there is considerable co-
operation between the branches, which is necessary for them to function at all. Even so, the
point remains true at the level of generality.
50 Litigation over issues such as the balanced budget, the power of Congress to appoint
special prosecutors, the legislative veto, and the constitutionality of sentencing guidelines has
made separation of powers one of the most hotly debated issues in recent years. Indeed,
"Harper's Index!' reports a 224 percent increase, since 1959, in the number of U.S. Supreme
Court cases that involve disputes over the separation of powers: (September 1989) 279
Harper's 15 (quoting Geoffrey Miller, University of Chicago Law School).
51 These events can only partly be explained by partisan politics. At least in part, they
were contests about the balance of power in a system of government that separates the
different branches of government as a matter of constitutional imperative.
52 One of the reasons the U.S. Supreme Court does not give advisory opinions is that
it would be institutionally embarrassing to provide an interpretation and have it disregarded.
Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). In the jurisprudence, the classic case is Marbury
v. Madison, supra, note 21, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that President Jefferson had
acted illegally but concluded that an order of mandamus could not issue because the
legislation authorizing the remedy was itself unconstitutional. The orthodox view of Marbury
is that the Court only invalidated the legislation to avoid the risk, which at the time was a real
one, that President Jefferson would simply ignore a mandamus. Although there are many
other examples, President Roosevelt's plan to deliver a speech defying the decision he expected
the U.S. Supreme Court to reach in the Gold Clause Cases of 1935 is one of the more
dramatic ones. When the Supreme Court decided in the government's favour, the speech
became unnecessary. (The Gold Clause Cases resulted from various challenges to the Joint
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President and Congress respond to important constitutional decisions
by threatening to reorganize the Court,5 3 to restrict its jurisdiction,
5 4
or to initiate a constitutional amendment.55
To preserve its institutional status, the u.s. Supreme Court
must exercise its authority. In other words, to remain a co-equal,
the Court must act like a co-equal.56  The judiciary can
unquestionably avoid confrontation with the other branches through
the political questions doctrine, Article HI's "case or controversy"
requirement, or a battery of principles of institutional prudence
5 7
However, when it considers it necessary, the u.s. Supreme Court will
vigourously defend its authority to interpret the Constitution.5 8
Resolution of 5 June 1933, which took the U.S. dollar off the gold standard. See Norman v.
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (sustaining the power of Congress to
invalidate gold clauses in private money contracts); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935)
(dismissing a claim for damages suffered when payment on gold certificates was made in
dollars rather than gold); and Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935) (dismissing a claim
for damages suffered for payment in dollars rather than gold on government bonds).)
53 The Court-packing plan of 1937, which would have enabled Roosevelt to increase the
U.S. Supreme Court from nine to fifteen members, is the most famous occasion on which
the executive branch sought to control the judiciary by altering its composition. Roosevelt's
Court reorganization plan was modelled on a similar plan which was drafted, but not
implemented, in 1913.
54 Whether Congress can restrict the Supreme Court's subject matter jurisdiction over
controversial subjects such as abortion, school prayer, school busing, and pornography remains
unresolved, despite having been debated regularly and at length. Even so, all congressional
initiatives proposing to restrict the Supreme Court's jurisdiction have failed in recent years.
55 The XIth and XVIth Amendments, dealing respectively with governmental immunity
and the power to levy an income tax, both had their genesis in U.S. Supreme Court decisions
whose reversal was thought necessary. Despite those successes, the unsuccessful attempt, in
the early twentieth century, to overcome, through constitutional amendment, a Supreme Court
decision invalidating child labour legislation, together with the more recent history of the
XXVIIth Amendment (the Equal Rights Amendment), demonstrates how difficult it is to
secure any amendment to the Constitution.
56 This is a task of some delicacy- the U.S. Supreme Court must exercise sufficient
power to maintain its institutional status, but not so much as to provoke disobedience or
retaliation from the other branches or levels of government.
57 See, generally, L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 2d ed. (Mineola, N.Y.: The
Foundation Press, 1988) c. 3, especially § 3-7ff.
58 The principles the Court invokes to avoid a constitutional decision can be traced to
the separation of powers. Notwithstanding its respect for the jurisdiction of the other
branches, the U.S. Supreme Court has demonstrated its willingness to defend its power of
review. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), in which the Court denied President
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The dynamics of federalism also affect institutional relations
in the United States. State autonomy was the practical reality and
the underlying assumption at the time the Constitution was ratified.5 9
Despite that scheme, adversarial relations between the federal
judiciary and the state legislatures have been the norm of
constitutional adjudication in the twentieth century.6° Although
conscious of the need to respect state autonomy, the u.s. Supreme
Court has exercised control over the state legislatures and officials
responsible for the administration of criminal justice. In decisions
like Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade, it has decreed,
respectively, that segregation is unequivocally unconstitutional and
that regulation is only permissible at certain stages and under certain
circumstances during a pregnancy.61  Far from encouraging the
legislatures to respond and fill in the gaps, as Morgentaler appeared
to do, the u.s. Supreme Court often leaves them as little room as
possible for further regulation. This approach can only partly be
explained by differences in the federal systems of the two
countries. 62
Nixon executive privilege in the Watergate tape case; and Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958),
in which the Court announced that Brown v. Board of Education was binding, not just on the
parties to the litigation, but on the entire nation.
59 Unlike the Constitution Act 1867, which divides jurisdiction between the two levels
of government, the U.S. Constitution is selectively concerned with the scope of federal
authority and, just as importantly, with limits on its power. As the Xth Amendment
acknowledges, state autonomy is the underlying assumption of the U.S. Constitution. At the
same time, however, the supremacy clause in Article VI makes the federal Constitution and
laws pursuant to it paramount over state Constitutions and statutes inconsistent with it.
60 Federalism is an important dimension of American individual rights litigation because
whenever the federal judiciary enforces rights, the states lose the authority to enact laws which
interfere with any of the Bill of Rights or Civil War amendments. In this way, federalism and
individual rights have always been interrelated in the United States.
61 Although Brown v. Board of Education, supra, note 15 was initially limited by the
narrow decision that public school desegregation was uniquely unconstitutional, the Court
invoked its full authority to implement that decision and extend its scope through per curiam
orders. Similarly, despite a complex jurisprudence interpreting its requirements, Roe v. Wade,
supra, note 9 promulgated explicit, unequivocal standards to govern the issue of abortion.
62 Although the federal government has jurisdiction over the criminal law under section
91(27) of Canada's Constitution Ac4 1867, the states retain their "police power" under the
American federal scheme. Part of the explanation of cases like Brown and Roe is that the
U.S. Supreme Court has to be unequivocal and explicit about the Constitution's requirements
in order, realistically, to exercise any control. It is undoubtedly more difficult for the U.S.
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Separation of powers psychology affects the legislatures as
well as the judiciary. Congress often debates the constitutional
merits of proposed legislation, and declines to enact laws if there are
serious concerns about their constitutionality.63 At the state level,
however, American legislatures are less concerned about the moral
limits of their power. This is not to suggest that the states enact
statutes without regard to the federal Constitution. Such an
assessment would be patently unfair. Nonetheless, the fact of
judicial review encourages the legislatures to test the outer limits of
their constitutional authority. When a court invalidates legislation
which a democratic majority has passed, the adversarial flavour of
institutional relations often results in renewed legislative efforts to
circumvent or bypass the judicial decree. Roe v. Wade provides a
classic example.
64
At both federal and state levels, the separation of powers
requires each branch to protect its authority from the others.
Paradoxically, although separation establishes the judiciary as an
independent branch, the power of review renders it impossible for
it to function independently of politics. One consequence is that
legislatures are free to pursue majoritarian objectives, because the
obligation of protecting individuals from the democratic will belongs
to the judiciary. 65 At the same time, however, the u.s. Supreme
Court threatens the hegemony of the majority. A concept of moral
responsibility, which is legal rather than political, has enabled
Supreme Court to constrict fifty states than it is for the Supreme Court of Canada to
supervise the actions of ten provinces, despite the extensive jurisdiction over "property and
civil rights" which the provinces possess under section,92(13) of the Constitution Ac 1867.
Even so, I believe that the American constitutional jurisprudence is as deeply influenced by
separation of powers principles as it is by any pragmatic awareness of the difficulty of
controlling the states.
63 See supra, note 54.
64 State legislatures have attempted to circumvent the U.S. Supreme Court's
constitutional trimester framework and to discourage abortions in ways too numerous to
mention. They have tried to undercut Roe v. Wade through spousal and parental consent
requirements, elaborate "informed consent" procedures, funding decisions, and by regulations
about the procedure itself and disposal of fetal remains. See Webster, supra, note 40.
65 The classic statement is by J.B. Thayer in John Marshall (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1901) at 103-04, 106-07, quoted in A.M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme
Court at the Bar of Politics (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962) at 21-22.
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legislatures to express hostility toward judicial decisions which defy
the collective will on issues like school prayer or capital punishment.
In the end, it is impossible for the u.s. Supreme Court to avoid
provoking the other branches. Largely due to federalism, but also
to the adversarial nature of institutional relations, the American
Court could not have responded in Roe v. Wade the way the
Supreme Court of Canada did in Morgentaler. Doing so would not
only have been incompatible with the judiciary's status as co-equal,
but it would also have made it institutionally impossible to issue any
constitutional standard on the right of privacy.
66
A different perception of Morgentaler emerges when
American assumptions about institutional relations and the separation
of powers are grafted onto the Charter. The students assumed that
Canada's traditional principle of supremacy would induce an
adversarial and hostile relationship between the parliamentary and
judicial branches. To them, the significance of the Charter was that
an institution that had been supreme was now forced to yield to the
judiciary. In such circumstances, the American instinct was that
Parliament would resent this loss of authority.67  Because that
interpretation sees power as discrete and proprietary, it is a typically
American response which regards its loss as anathema.
Some of the students assumed that the decision in
Morgentaler was deferential because the tradition of parliamentary
supremacy had not waned sufficiently for the Supreme Court of
Canada to exercise its new-found powers confidently. They
speculated that the judiciary was concerned about provoking the
legislatures to invoke section 33. Again, because it displays a
possessive and jealous attitude about power, this too was a typically
American interpretation. Although the potential for parliamentary
resentment of judicial authority and judicial timidity both exist,
neither has crystallized at this stage of the Charter's evolution.
Moreover, each projects American values onto our Constitution.
66 For a partial explanation of the reasons why, see the discussion of the override and
The French Language Case, infra at 635ff.
67 And be inclined, as a result, to invoke the override.
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Early Charter interpretation has not been especially deferential.68 In
any event, given that the parliamentary branches in Canada
purposely transferred authority to the judiciary in 1982, any
immediate development of adversarial relations would be surprising.Y
9
Oddly enough, both levels of government fund litigation which
challenges the state's authority, and often, the state declines to
appeal adverse decisions.
70
As Morgentaler illustrates, relations between Parliament and
the judiciary are more co-operative and more subtle in Canada.
Despite the division of powers jurisprudence, the judiciary has not
been perceived as a threat to the legislature. It has functioned less
as an adversary and more as an advisor. Review was instigated
under the Colonial Laws Validity Act as an advisory mechanism, and
the reference procedure continues to this day. These roots confirm
that review in Canada rests at least formally and in part on an
advisory rationale.71 Although Prime Minister Trudeau could have
exercised his legal authority in defiance of The Patriation Reference,
that episode is an isolated example. 72 Ironically, although our
At the same time, however, it is fair to say that it has vacillated between activism
and restraint.
69 Justice Lamer makes this point in The Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 5 at 497.
Although some of the provinces were hostile to the concept of constitutional rights at the time
the Charter was being negotiated, it is significant nonetheless that the Charter was enacted.
Even if legislatures may not like the results of particular decisions, the Charter is recent
enough to estop them from denouncing the concept of individual rights altogether. Any
government that did so would lose many votes.
70 Documenting this point would unduly lengthen this article. To me, it is striking how
often the government accepts a finding of unconstitutionality instead of fighting the legal issue
through final appeal.- Once again, I believe this response is distinctly Canadian, un-American,
and directly attributable to a parliamentary tradition in which adversarial relations between
the judicial and law making branches are less apparent.
71 See, generally, "Introduction" in B.L. Strayer, Judicial Review of Legislation in Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968).
72 Supra, note 34. Note, as well, that although it disavowed the constitutional
amendments of 1982, including the Charter, the province of Quebec participates in appeals to
the Supreme Court of Canada and, excluding The French Language Case, has done little to
undermine decisions that affect its autonomy. See, for example, The Quebec Veto Reference,
A.G. Quebec v. A.G. Canada, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793 (rejecting the claim that Quebec has a
unique veto over constitutional amendments) and A.G. Quebec v. Quebec Protestant School
Boards, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66 (invalidating provisions of Quebec's language education law).
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constitutional tradition might suggest antagonistic institutional
relations, it is precisely because of Parliament's supremacy that the
legislatures and the courts do not view themselves as adversaries.
For that reason, the Canadian abortion debate saw the judiciary and
parliamentary branches defer to each other, not only to avoid
responsibility for the issue, but also, to avoid an institutional
confrontation. A see-saw of this nature could never occur in the
United States.
73
D. The French Language Case
74
Professor William Tetley of McGill University agreed to
provide a guest lecture on The French Language Case. Tetley has
defended prohibitions on the use of the English language in Quebec,
and may be the most vocal anglophone Quebecker to do so. The
French Language Case invalidated legislation banning the use of the
English language in commercial advertising.75 Bill 178, which was
enacted in response to the decision, invoked the section 33 override
to protect measures prohibiting any display of the English language
on the exterior of commercial establishments, while permitting its
use, on a restricted basis, inside.
It would have been impossible to provide American students
with a condensed but comprehensive overview of the language issue
in Canada. Even without its legal and constitutional components,
language is a complex regional, cultural, and historical question in
Professor Slattery has suggested that the parliamentary branches also have obligations
under the Charter. Although his is a much more philosophical piece, he claims that the
Charter mandates a dialogue between Parliament and the courts. My claim is that, although
its nature and quality have not yet been fully explored, an institutional dialogue is one feature
of our constitutional culture that distinguishes us from the United States. The mutual
abdication of responsibility which marks the abortion debate in Canada is an example of a
dialogue that foundered, but which exists nonetheless. See B. Slattery, "A Theory of the
Charter" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall LJ. 701.
74 Supra, note 7.
75 The Supreme Court of Canada held that although the legislation prohibiting English
language advertising had initially been protected from the Charter by a valid invocation of the
override, to the extent that provision had lapsed, the prohibition was inconsistent with section
2(b) of the Charter.
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this country, and may even be the most important feature of our
national existence. In the absence of some parallel in their own
experience, my intuition was that Americans would find the dynamics
of The French Language Case and its legislative aftermath difficult
to grasp. The students were visibly disturbed by Tetley's argument
that Quebec's action in restricting English language rights was a
justifiable measure to preserve one of Canada's founding cultures.
76
Instead, they saw it as a flagrant attack on minority rights.
Throughout, they shifted uncomfortably in their chairs. Although
some students challenged Tetley's views, it was not an especially
lively session. One person explained afterward that further
discussion was pointless.
The first assignment required the students to write a short
paper on one of three or four subjects. Although Canadian students
normally decline the opportunity to write about section 33, nearly
half the American class opted to write about the override. The
reason why soon became apparent. The override was a concept
they found impossible to fathom, much less to accept. From an
American perspective, their response was predictable. Culturally and
ideologically, it made perfect sense.
As far as they were concerned, the purpose of constitutional
rights is to protect minorities from the actions of a legislative
majority. Given this assumption, how could a provision allowing the
legislature to opt out of its guarantees co-exist with the concept of
a Constitution? As Chief Justice Marshall had argued in Marbury
v. Madison, "The constitution is either a superior, paramount law,
unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary
legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature
shall please to alter it." Significantly, he concluded that between
these alternatives "there is no middle ground."77 In responding to
the override, the Cornell students simply rehearsed the first
orthodoxy of American constitutionalism.
As I read their papers and revived the issue next class, it
troubled me that I found it progressively more difficult to defend the
76 See, for example, W. Tetley, "Why Not Let the Majority Have its Way on Signs?" The
Globe and Mail (17 January 1989) A7.
77 Supra, note 21 at 177.
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override. I argued that the framers thought it would only rarely be
invoked, on questions of relatively minor political importance.78
Any notion that the override would not be used on controversial
issues was naive and absurd, the students retorted. In the United
States, they alleged, the legislatures would not be at all hesitant to
use a similar power, in which case, they reminded me, it would not
be difficult to predict the fate of Brown v. Board of Education and
any number of controversial criminal justice or First Amendment
decisions. I found it impossible to disagree with that assessment.
As for Canada, res ipsa loquitur summed up their assessment of
minority language rights in Quebec.
In a variation on my first point, I also argued that the
framers believed that the ethic of responsible government would
discourage legislatures from invoking the override.79 The theory was
that the morality of relying on overriding constitutional rights would
be so questionable that, not only would legislatures shy from using
it on important issues, they would also understand that the political
costs would invariably outweigh the benefit of any immunity from
review that would accrue. Thus, the prospect of political
repercussions would discourage any rash or reckless resort to the
override.
The American students did not find this explanation even
remotely persuasive. They explained that by including an override,
the Charter promotes the transgression of individual rights. Far
from indicating any moral disapproval, the text of section 33 actually
encourages the state to violate the Charter.
In trying to explain how our framers could have overlooked
the legitimizing effect of the text, I found a way to show how
78 The then Minister of Justice Jean Chrdtien stated, in the House of Commons, that
section 33 "is unlikely ever to be used except in non-controversial circumstances": Canada,
H.C., Debates at 13042 (20 November 1981).
79 Seeking to justify section 33, Jean Chr6tien noted that Quebec bowed to "public
pressure' and abandoned its one previous attempt to use an override: Canada, H.C., Debates
at 13043 (20 November 1981). Many commentators echoed the view that use of the override
would involve considerable political risk: see P.W. Hogg, "Canada's New Charter of Rights"
(1984) 32 Am. J. Comp. L. 283 at 298; and D. Gibson, The Law of the Charter General
inciples (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 126.
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different we are8 0 Despite the influence of natural law concepts,
Americans are profoundly positivistic. This is reflected in the fact
that they were the first nation to have a written constitution. The
constitutional text is supreme law, and the u.s. Supreme Court has
claimed that status for its interpretations of the Constitution.81 In
American culture, the Constitution is not just a legal document, it
is a statement of the nation's fundamental values. Action that the
text authorizes is not merely legal but is justifiable from a normative
point of view as well. Although the text may permit action that is
unwise, any further discussion of its constitutional morality is
foreclosed. Because the purpose of their Constitution is to make it
difficult for legislatures to legislate unwisely, American students
found the prospect of an override sanctioning outright abridgment of
the Charter's guarantees horrifying.
We are not as offended by the override at this point in time
because political morals have a different source of authority in our
tradition. Instead of being found in a legal text, the source of that
authority is organic. As The Patriation Reference82 confirmed, our
morals of government are rooted in conventions which depend for
their success on negotiation, co-operation, and respect for the
principle of responsible government. By contrast, the American
system of government is rule-oriented, and based on a conception of
social and political relations that is defined institutionally, by legal
relations and the specific terms of a constitutional text. Our
framers' assumption that the override would only rarely be invoked
may well have been naive; more precisely, however, it reflected a
different conception of political responsibility. They did not include
the override because they expected it to be used at will. Assuming
that the democratic process would function smoothly and that the
participants would observe the conventions of responsible
government, they concluded that legislatures would be constrained
80 It should be noted that some of those who participated in the process of constitutional
reform contemplated a different role for the override, as a true democratic check on the
institution of review.
81 Cooper v. Aaron, supra, note 58 at 18, provides the classic statement (asserting that
"the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution ... and that
is a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system').
82 Supra, note 34.
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from exercising an unfettered legal power by the substantive norms
of our political tradition.
Finally, I defended the override on its merits. It is not
inappropriate, I suggested, for the responsibility over relations
between the individual and the state to rest with the legislature
rather than the judiciary. Conceding that an argument in favour of
review might be irrebuttable in the United States today, I tried to
show that the same is not true of Canada.
83
Once again, their response was revealing. They claimed that
the override is illogical because judicial review is consistent with
democracy.84 The argument was one only Americans could make.
Judicial review is democratic, they insisted, because it protects the
individual from the state. In the United States, it is the people,
both individually and collectively, which comprise the democratic
unit. The institutional structures of the state are an artifice and a
threat to a conception of democracy that, symbolically and
ideologically, makes the people ultimately supreme. Individual rights
must be protected because dignity of and respect for individuals are
the prerequisites of a healthy democracy. When the artifices of the
state interfere with individual rights, the American concept of
democracy is harmed. By forcing the state to respect individual
rights, the judiciary reinforces democracy in America.
83 Although Canadian legislation may be imperfect and intrusive of individual rights at
this point in time, it is still true that many of the battles against discrimination, censorship,
and torture of criminal offenders have been largely won. In the United States of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the need for a federal judiciary to supervise the laws of
fifty states which possess unrestricted powers to regulate their criminal and civil justice systems
is more apparent. Here, the ten provinces are each more conspicuous in their actions and,
constitutionally, do not possess the wide powers the individual U.S. states have traditionally
exercised. Finally, the textual separation of powers and the establishment of the judiciary as
a co-equal branch under a written constitution may have made judicial review inevitable in the
United States. If division of powers review was made inevitable in Canada by the adoption
of a federal union, the same is not true of rights review.
84 As the debate on judicial review attests, not all Americans would make this claim. I
suspect, however, that at the level of popular belief, many would agree with this statement.
In her paper "The Override Provision of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms -
Does It Make Sense," one student contended that the override is undemocratic: '"he override
provision ... is not a force for democracy. It allows a government to tyrannize in classical
fashion: to repress expression, to detain or imprison arbitrarily, to detain without giving a
reason, and to search unreasonably."
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By explaining democracy in terms of the prevalence of
individual rights over community values, this interpretation was
distinctly American. But for them, it is not inaccurate. To
Americans, democracy means the people, and the people means
individuals. The state can only act with the consent of the governed,
and to the extent the state compromises individual rights, it violates
the first principle of the American Constitution: self-government.
If the American myth is that democracy is the people, its
Canadian counterpart is that Parliament is responsible. The theory
of a parliamentary system is that because it is responsible, it is
definitionally impossible for Parliament to be undemocratic. This
version of democracy suggests that it is the judiciary that is
undemocratic, rather than the representative institutions. According
to traditional values, the final responsibility should rest with
Parliament, rather than with the judiciary. In ideological terms, the
critical point is that whereas the American interpretation of
democracy allows individual rights to prevail over collective values,
our tradition has been able, thus far, to reconcile the Charter's
protection of individual rights with the community's prerogative to
enforce its values through the override.
I. CONCLUSION
In teaching this course, I hoped to inculcate some
understanding of Canadian constitutional culture in American
students, as well as encourage a richer appreciation of their own
constitutional tradition. Speaking for myself, I know that this class
of fifteen gave me fresh insight into the Charter, and deepened my
understanding of American constitutional culture at the same time.
Although their ability to bridge the cultural gap was limited, they
conceded that Canada was more complex and intriguing than they
had realized, and acknowledged that Americans have much to learn
from us. As for all of us, by the end of the course, this much was
true: when we said our good-byes, they realized that they knew why
they were happy to be American instead of Canadian, and I realized,
one more time, why I like being Canadian. I'm guessing that made
the course a success.
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